LANGUAGE AS

SYMBOLIC ACTION

Essays on Life, Literature, and Method

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Rhetoric and Poetics

Recently I heard a discussion on the Poetics of motion pictures. One speaker attempted to build his theory about the respects in which the medium is unique. The other pointed out that some aspects of motion pictures were present in other arts. For instance, in some respects the motion picture is analogous to drama or narrative.

Is not Aristotle’s Poetics the proper example to keep in mind here? When turning from Tragedy to Epic, Aristotle considers both the elements they have in common and the respects in which they differ. Similarly, as regards Rhetoric and Poetics, is it not true that, whatever their differences, they also have an area of overlap, since either Poetry or the exercisings of Rhetoric can be enjoyed for their own sake?

And now I am already in a bit of trouble. In general, I approach the problem thus:

Language is taken as “the given.” Man is viewed as the kind of animal that is distinguished by his prowess in symbolic action. The poetic motive is viewed as symbolic action undertaken in and for itself. Just as, in being an animal that lives by locomotion, man moves not merely for purposes of acquisition or avoidance but also through the sheer delight in being free to move, so in being the typically symbol-using animal he takes a natural delight in the exercising of his powers with symbols. In extreme cases, we can distinguish between the Poetic and the Rhetorical here when we think of “Art for Art’s Sake” in contrast with deliberative and forensic oratory as discussed in Aristotle, or with the third office of the orator, as discussed in Cicero.

But does not epideictic readily become transformed into a display art, pure and simple? Indeed, as Charles Searl Baldwin’s histories of Rhetoric and Poetic make clear, there seem to have been times when the less men had to say, the greater was their delight in the saying. The anthropologist Malinowski proposed the term “phatic communion” to designate the social satisfaction of sheer chatter. And we should have a hard time trying to make sure whether the renewed interest in glossoalia should be treated in terms of
poetics or rhetoric (though some, I assume, would class it purely under the head of manifestations to be studied by psychiatry).

Our problem is further complicated by the fact that, terms like poetic and rhetoric having been used in many different situations, one cannot expect them to stay put. Since it is a sheer fact of history that their meanings have shifted, we must admit as much, then try to show the logic of their transformations. And if Longinus can quote equally from poet and orator (Homer and Demosthenes), the equal availability of examples from the two fields is doubtless due in part to the fact that, though Demosthenes was definitely a rhetorician at the time he wrote, his persuasiveness becomes more like sheer literary appeal, once the occasions on which he spoke cease to be felt as immediately burning issues.

In Shakespeare’s *Use of the Arts of Language* Sister Miriam Joseph illustrates from the plays of Shakespeare (surely the realm of Poetics par excellence) many figures listed in such authors as Quintilian (Books VII-IX). And in her *Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, Renaissance Poetic and Twentieth-Century Criticism*, Rosemond Tuve cites many instances of works in which the persuasive and dissuasive resources of rhetoric were imitated for purely poetic purposes.

(In my *Rhetoric of Motives*, I have suggested the possibility that the appeal in the sheer forms of expression—be they called poetic or rhetorical—is *universal*. Hence, an audience can readily yield to this aspect of an exhortation. And in thus responding to the *doctrinally neutral* aspects of the address, the audience is in more of a mood to accept by contagion the rest of the author’s plea.)

As for the probable source of the divergence between rhetorical and poetic expression (where they do diverge!): I would assume that rhetoric was developed by the use of language for purposes of cooperation and competition. It served to form appropriate attitudes that were designed to induce corresponding acts (the *flectere or move re* of Cicero’s third office). But Poetics could still be concerned with symbolic action for its own sake, without reference to purposes in the practical, nonartistic realm. It could exploit, to the ends of entertainment, the *conflict* that arise among the tribal attitudes. Consider, for instance, how many plays (such as Sophocles’ *Antigone*) have given poetic pleasure by exploiting variations on the theme of the conflict between love and duty. Or one might prefer simply to view the play as a device for exploiting a conflict between two kinds of duty.

In sum, where a rhetorician might conceivably argue the cause of Love rather than Duty, or the other way round, in Poetics a profound dramatizing of the conflict itself would be enough; for in this field the imitation of great practical or moral problems is itself a source of gratification.

As regards the relation between the two fields in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* of Aristotle: When, in the *Poetics*, on the subject of Thought *(dianoia)* the reader is referred to the *Rhetoric*, I take it first of all that we are expected to find in the *Rhetoric* the kind of things a person should say, to fit the kind of character the dramatist would have him be, and to arouse the kind of attitude the dramatist would arouse in the audience with regard to that character.

But could there not also be a wider application? Many of the topics in the *Rhetoric* are in effect epitomized situations—and insofar as actions speak louder than words, the topics might also be said to have a corresponding Poetic application. For if a man can mollify us or enrage us by saying gentle or arrogant things respectively, then it is all the more likely that gentle or arrogant conduct can have the same effects. Thus, the poet can produce characters by conceiving of plots in which his puppets (by imitation) do as well as say the sort of things listed in the topics.

Where the topics are reflected in actual statements on the part of the characters, I would incline to feel that, as far as possible, all such dialogue should be treated as poetic functions rather than as philosophic or religious “truths.” That is to say: As far as possible, one should treat a play not as “about” religion or fate, and such (in the sense of being contributions to theology, science, history, and the like), but as using religion or fate or revolt and such for the production of poetic effects.

But one might ask: If the poetic motive involves symbolic action for its own sake, what do we do as regards the last clause in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy, “through pity and fear effecting the catharsis of such emotions”? This has to be discussed, though I am aware that, no matter what one might say on this subject, one is bound to encounter some resistance.

From the standpoint of our present specific concerns we must ask: Is this clause wholly in the realm of Poetics? Or does it bulge over into the realm of Rhetoric? Here is my suggestion for finding our way around in this problem:

Since it is stated in the *Politics* that the subject of catharsis is to get further treatment in the *Poetics*, I assume that there was such a section, and that the two are closely related. In the *Politics* the treatment seems to be rhetorical in the sense that music is there viewed as having utilitarian (medicinal) effects upon an audience. And since the subject is discussed in connection with disruptive tendencies in the State, I assume that there must be some analogous (though not necessarily identical) effect with regard to Greek tragedy. Also, on this point, we might recall that a performance of Greek tragedy was probably much nearer to opera than to straight drama as we know it.

We have already considered the natural grounds for human delight in symbolic action. Similarly, the greater the range and intenseness of the opportunities for the exercising of our symbolic prowess, the greater might be our delight in such modes of action. Symbolic action for its own sake,
in so great range and intensity, is of course supplied by the kinds of work that are the primary concern of Poetics. They are works that excite our sense of wonder and terror, artistic imitations that move us to laughter or tears.

At first glance, one might think that the notion of symbolic action for its own sake would not be consistent with doctrines like the Aristotelian view of tragedy as purgative. Yet, just as people who are expert at solving puzzles will prefer hard ones, so the delights of symbolic action will be increased by the imitation of grave and serious conflicts.

If, then, in the case of tragedy, a dramatist contrives to imitate some of the most poignant situations conceivable, in bringing them to a state of formal resolution he will have contributed just about as much as possible to the delights of symbolic exercising. Also, inasmuch as the ending really is a “resolution,” all the turmoil will somehow have been “cleaned up.” Through the pleasurable exciting of our capacities for pity and fear as related to one particular set of individuations, when we come to the formal resolution we shall in effect have gone beyond this very tangle.

At this point, an aside is in order. It involves a step of mine in arrantly amateurish etymology. It has to do with the fact that a resolution “goes beyond” the motivational tangle exploited for the purposes of poetic enjoyment. (And maybe, at this point, along with reference to Aristotle on the tragic “pleasure,” I should bolster my position by also citing from Coleridge, Biographia Literaria: “A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth.”)

As for “going beyond”: In the final clause of Aristotle’s definition (usually translated in some such way as: “through pity and fear effecting the catharsis of such emotions”), I find it of significance that the word that is translated “effecting,” or “producing” (perainousa) is etymologically from the same root as peran, which means “opposite shore.” And I’d relate it to the line in the sixth book of the Aeneid where the shades are said to have “stretched forth their hands through love of the opposite shore” (tendebantique manus ripae ulterioris amore).

So, experimentally, I would propose to make up an English verb, “to beyond,” and thus to translate the Aristotelian formula: “through pity and fear beyonding the catharsis of such emotions.” This tentative invention fits perfectly for the one surviving tragic trilogy, Aeschylus’ Oresteia, a kind of form which is not even mentioned in the extant portions of the Poetics. In the Agamemnon, the Libation Bearers, and the beginning of the Eumenides, we confront the fearful and the pitiable. But towards the end, we go beyond pity and fear, feudal justice gives way to the justice of the law courts, and the Furies themselves become transformed, their emphasis henceforth to be not so much upon the punishing of evil as upon the rewarding of good.

Rhetoric and Poetics

Similarly, in the Divine Comedy: Fear is central to the Inferno, pity to the Purgatorio (recall the singing of lines from the Miserere)—and we are beyond these states in the Paradiso. In the single kinds of tragedy that Aristotle deals with, the “beyonding” is, as it were, like a fan folded, so that all three stages can transpire at once. The clearest instance is Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus. We feel pity and fear at his death precisely when he is transcending the miseries of this world—that is, going beyond them, and becoming a tutelary deity.

We must go a bit round about, to make clear just how this issue bears upon the relation between Rhetoric and Poetics. The Poetics of tragedy explicitly deals with transformation by victimage. The audience is edified by sympathetically witnessing the imitation of a “good” (chrestos) character being sacrificed.

At the extremes (as made clear by Nietzsche’s rage against the dialectic of reform in contrast with the cult of tragic sacrifice) there is the different medicine got along Platonic lines by transcendence.

We have already considered (in Oedipus at Colonus) a kind of work in which the two overlap. But there are cases where they are clearly different, the most direct case I can think of being the dialectic of Emersonian transcendentalism, in his early essay on Nature. Here the stress upon the kill is at an absolute minimum, though there is a sacrificial motive (notably in the chapter on “Discipline”). But we can discern a strong rhetorical ingredient implicit in the dialectic, which is designed to interpret social motives in terms of nature, while nature in turn is interpreted in terms of the supernatural; hence social motives become infused with the spirit of the supernatural. The rhetorical implications of such a dialectic become obvious as soon as we stop to realize, for instance, how such a terministic setup would make a Marxist dialectic impossible, and thus would automatically rule out the corresponding rhetorical ingredients implicit in the Marxist dialectic.

The dialectic of transcendence amounts to a mode of interpretation by treating of empirical things-here-and-now in terms of a Beyond (be this, in its simplest form, but a way to view terms of lower generalization as inspired by terms of higher generalization). Obviously, such a dialectic has notable rhetorical implications since the view of things hic et nunc in terms of a Beyond implies a corresponding attitude towards them, with corresponding implications of policy, or action.

However, such modes of transcendence can also be confined to purely poetic functions. E. M. Forster’s novel, A Passage to India, is well worth considering in this regard. I postulate as its effect “ironically sympathetic contemplation.” (That is, I would offer this formula as the equivalent, in this kind of modern novel, for the clause that Aristotle discussed in terms of catharsis, as regards Greek tragedy.) The book centers in ways whereby
the modes of mystery or embarrassment associated with social divisiveness (the social ladder) are infused with imagery of cosmic mystery. All this gets sloganized in the question whether India is a muddle or a mystery. The novel leaves the issue fluctuant, in contrast with Emerson’s simple and happy transcendental solution.

As regards these shifting back and forth between the realms of Rhetoric and Poetics, many aspects of the matter must be left undiscussed. But I might at least reiterate a couple of paragraphs I wrote in connection with a recent Symposium on Formalist Criticism, at the University of Texas. They concern a problem having to do with the novels of William Faulkner (as treated in a book by Cleanth Brooks).

In Faulkner’s case we confront a situation which almost inevitably involves (these days at least) an invasion of Poetics by a problem in Rhetoric. For instance, whatever relevance Shakespeare’s Coriolanus may have had to conditions in London at that time, the play on its face was about factionalism in ancient Rome. Similarly, indications are that in The Trojan Women Euripides was alluding to a contemporary incident, the outrageous sack of Melos that the war party of Athens had engineered about six months before the production of the play; but the work itself got a kind of “distance” by treating of such issues in terms of “primal” Greek tradition, the sack of Troy.

Regionalist literature proceeds in a quite different manner. Its kind of “verisimilitude” is strongly influenced by modern, scientific concepts of realism, which has dispensed with much of the ritual in older forms. . . . Fiction is often made to look not just like an artistic “imitation,” but rather, to have the quality of a documentary “record.” In contrast with Shakespeare’s play about “Rome,” or Euripides’ play about “Troy,” Regionalist literature is written as by someone who “was there,” hence it has a suggestion of expert “field work.”

Accordingly, if the author would entertain his public by trying to make his work seem representative of some Region, and if at the same time—if only for formal reasons—he weaves into his background some tales of violence, corruption, “outrage,” he will necessarily confront a dilemma. For if his readers take his books at face value, and are outsiders (“outlanders”), they may irritate him by interpreting his books simply as an indictment. Yet, though he would like the “outlanders” to read his work and be persuaded by it, he must feel that they are like intruders in the dust of his homeland. For the true Regionalist does not write like an exile who has fled from his country and is appealing to the world against a regime that has it in bondage. Rather, the Regionalist is one who, at least in principle and in Faulkner’s case actually, remains at home. Though he tries to make his plots look “real,” he naturally resents it if critics of Marxist cast, or the sociologically-minded in general, look upon them simply as the “evidence” which (in a purely poetic sense) he strives to make them resemble. For many of his readers approach the work from “outside,” whereas he had written it from the inside, with corresponding differences of attitude. Thus the books are like what Mr. Brooks aptly calls Charles Malison’s “lover’s quarrel” with his neighbors; yet the nature of publication has in effect invited all the world to listen in.

But I’d like to end on a question that has to do primarily with Rhetoric (though, as always, it provides material for corresponding but different application to the realm of Poetics).

It concerns the feasibility of doing what I did in my Rhetoric of Motives, when I introduced the concepts of Identification and Administrative Rhetoric.

Administrative Rhetoric is most clearly illustrated by Machiavelli’s The Prince. (Ovid’s Ars Amatoria turns much the same sort of topics into a poetic, by fancifully treating them as a species of Rhetorica docens.) The concept of Administrative Rhetoric involves a theory of persuasive devices which have a directly rhetorical aspect, yet include operations not confined to sheerly verbal persuasion. One example will suffice. It is a variant of what I would call the “blad” strategy. It goes back to the days when the German Emperor was showing signs of militancy—and Theodore Roosevelt sent out our fleet on a “goodwill mission.” Ostensibly paying the Emperor the compliment of a friendly visit, the President was exemplifying his political precept: “Speak softly, and carry a big stick.” His “goodwill” visit was clearly rhetorical insofar as it was designed blandly to use a display of force as a mode of persuasion.

Even Aristotle touches upon such a Rhetoric, in his brief discussion of “inartificial proofs”: laws, witnesses, contracts, tortures, and oaths. Here was a kind of inventio that might be treated as an extension of “bearing witness.”

The concept of Identification begins in a problem of this sort: Aristotle’s Rhetoric centers in the speaker’s explicit designs with regard to the confronting of an audience. But there are also ways in which we spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously persuade ourselves.

In forming ideas of our personal identity, we spontaneously identify ourselves with family, nation, political or cultural cause, church, and so on. In this regard, when Marx applies the term “class consciousness” to the Weltanschauung of the bourgeoisie, he is concerned with a kind of identification that could as properly be called “class unconsciousness.”

The concept is also relevant because it admonishes us to look for modes of Identification implicit or concealed in doctrines of “Autonomy” that figure prominently in our theories of technological specialization. Simplest instance: If the shepherd is guarding the sheep so that they may be raised for market, though his role (considered in itself, as guardian of
the sheep) concerns only their good, he is implicitly identified with their slaughter. A total stress upon the autonomy of his pastoral specialization here functions rhetorically as a mode of expression whereby we are encouraged to overlook the full implications of his office. Identifications can also be deliberately established, as with the baby-kissing politician’s ways of kissing women on their babies.

There is another possible extension of Rhetoric, concealed from us by the terminologies of the sciences: By “topics” Aristotle obviously has in mind something quite close to what contemporary sociologists would call “values.” Much that in the old days would be called “persuasion” might now, following the lore of anthropology, be treated as “word magic.” “Style” becomes “ritual.” And in modern psychology the word “myth” has taken on meanings that considerably alter and extend the scope of the term as used in the Poetics. Even a popular expression such as “bedside manner” obviously has its rhetorical implications—and much stress upon love and transference in psychoanalytic remedies for sick souls might serve to deflect attention from the analyst’s schemes for building himself up as an authority.

Before closing, I’d like to bring out one notable feature implicit in the combining of Identification and Administrative Rhetoric. I refer to the great increase in the tendency of faculty members to identify themselves in a partly administrative way by signing petitions of protest against governmental policies that they find questionable. Such performances are saying in effect: “Whatever the autonomy of our field, in the mere act of remaining silent we are in effect identified with certain policies. So, in effect, we abandon the customary resources of the secret ballot; and by affixing our signatures (along with the names of our schools and departments) to certain public statements, we identify ourselves with the alternative policies proclaimed in this statement.”

This is no place to discuss the rights or wrongs of such procedures. But it does decidedly fit this talk for me to point out that implicit in signatures of this sort there are strong elements of Identification and Administrative Rhetoric.

To sum up: I would propose to view the relation between Rhetoric and Poetics thus:

The two fields readily become confused, because there is a large area which they share in common. Also, although some works lend themselves more readily to treatment in terms of Rhetoric than in terms of Poetics, or vice versa, even a work of pure science can be shown to have some Rhetorical or Poetic ingredients. With your permission, I shall end this talk by shifting my approach and giving an illustration rather than an argument.

Some time ago I happened to be working on a kind of satiric poem for which I wanted some especially resonant tonalities of invective. But, al-
ness in high places, where novices are lifted up with pride, and men of corrupt minds, reprobates (teachers of the law, who do not understand what they say), exhort servants to be disobedient to their own masters and to answer back, many are puffed up, and have swerved aside into vain jangling, not avoiding foolish questions, and contentions, and vain, unprofitable strivings about the law, giving heed rather to fables and endless genealogies, proud, knowing nothing but doting about questions and strifes of words (perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds from which come envy, strife, railings, and evil surmisings), ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth.

There are the effeminate, abusers of themselves with mankind, men leaving the natural use of women, and burning in their lust toward other men. And there are others which creep into houses, and lead away captive silly women laden with sins, led away with divers lusts.

And of women, there are wives who are not grave, not faithful in all things; they are idlers, tatlers, busybodies, wandering about from house to house speaking things which they ought not; and there are young widows that wax wanton, and women who do not learn in silence with all subjection, or who would teach, or usurp authority over a man, and are not silent.

In sum, there are the foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving diverse lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful and hating one another for their envys, murders, drunkenness, revelings, chambering, and such like, after hardness and impenitent heart, treasuring up unto the self wrath against the day of wrath, and thus, condemning themselves in judging others.1

This piece was presented in a Symposium on the History and Significance of Rhetoric, 1965, at the University of California, Los Angeles. An address on the same subject was delivered by Dr. Wilbur S. Howell. The major difference, as regards questions of method, is indicated by the subtitle of Dr. Howell's paper "A Plea for the Recognition of the Two Literatures." In brief he argued for the strict distinction (between the realms of Rhetoric and Poetic) that I confessed myself unable to maintain. But though Dr. Howell's address was given on the day following mine, it had been planned before my talk, hence did not directly refer to these particular pages. However, at the start it did deal with some statements of mine already printed. And I might properly add a postscript repeating some of the comments I made during the discussion period.

I cannot do well by his thesis as a whole. Much of it I missed entirely. For during the latter portions that did not directly concern me, I necessarily used the time trying to assemble my badly scattered forces. (I refer to the scattering within my own mind.) First, I wish to thank him for the several generous things he said in my favor; but I shall here review only the matters I mentioned in reply to his reservations:

As regards the large area of overlap which the realms of Rhetoric and Poetics have in common, I repeated my point about Longinus' quoting equally well from Demosthenes and Homer, or Sister Miriam Joseph's illustrating by quotations from Shakespearean drama the kinds of figures enumerated in Quintilian's work on rhetoric. In the nomenclature of Counter-Statement, these would be called "minor forms." And quite as they are to be found in both Rhetorical and Poetic texts, I still submit that the three fundamental principles in the dynamics of form (progressive form, repetitive form, and conventional form) are to be found in both Rhetorical and Poetic structures.

I regret that Dr. Howell did not discuss these principles seriatim. And though, when inquiring into the dynamics of a literary work, I still lay great stress upon the three principles of form as described in Counter-Statement, I naturally regret that Dr. Howell did not discuss my further extensions of Rhetoric, in my Rhetoric of Motives and Rhetoric of Religion.

Basically, the situation is this: I began in the aesthete tradition, with the stress upon self-expression. Things started moving for me in earnest when, as attested in Counter-Statement, I made the shift from "self-expression" to "communication." The theory of form (and "forms") centers in that distinction. For quite a while, as with many critics, I found it enough to work with these two terms, treating them as principles that variously correct and reinforce each other. But I am always happiest when I can transform any such dyad into a triad—and I subsequently did so by adding what I call "consummation." One can "track down the implications of a terminology" over and above the needs of either self-expression or communication (for instance, Beethoven's last quartets in his time, or James Joyce's later works)—and I'd want to treat such formal thoroughness as not strictly reducible to the arousing and fulfilling of expectations in an audience. Also, there are certain phenomena to do with the shift between terms for logical priority and terms for temporal priority which figure in the vocabularies of religion, viewed as modes of "persuasion" capable of both Rhetorical and Poetic analogues.

In leading up to his plea for a hard-and-fast distinction between the realms of Rhetoric and Poetics, Dr. Howell gave quite a list of distinctions made by various authors. For instance, De Quincey's distinction between literature of "knowledge" and literature of "power." Or Fenelon's statement that "good oratory is almost poetry," while "poetry paints with ecstasy." Or Baldwin's equating of Rhetoric with idea and Poetry with image (a distinction I have always found troublesome, since by this alignment such effective rhetorical images as Churchill's "iron curtain" or "power vacuum"
would belong in the realm of Poetics). Whereas Dr. Howell presumably cited such distinctions as an argument on his side (there were several more that escaped me), they really are an argument against him. For every one of them cuts at a different angle—and that's precisely why I think the best we can do is to show the logic behind the various cuts that can be made in the Rhetoric-Poetics pair. (Incidentally, though I did not say so at the time, when going over my article I realized that Dr. Howell could well have turned his dyad into a triad by adding dialectic as the third term, particularly in view of the fact that Aristotle somewhat metaphorically calls rhetoric the antistrophos of dialectic.)

In his discussion of my little parable about the author who, out of self-pity, writes a story about a King and a Peasant, Dr. Howell neglected to make clear the main point of the parable. It was designed to show why, even though our hypothetical author might begin his work out of nothing better than sheer self-pity, in the course of developing a persuasive story he would have to master many artistic problems not at all derivable from self-pity.

As I have said elsewhere with regard to the “extending” of Rhetoric (along the lines of such a “New Dispensation” as the modifying of persuasion by identification, or the study of rhetorically administrative acts after the fashion of Machiavelli, or by taking literally the usage whereby religions are called “persuasions”): The issue has its methodological grounding in the rise of aesthetics, with the corresponding exile of literary and academic traditions that had placed the stress upon Rhetoric, Poetics, and Dialectic. The exiled subjects found asylum in the “new sciences,” so that many of the older concepts now have new names—and often the new names open up implications not discernible in the old names. The job here is not to be simply “purists,” but rather to ask just how much of the new material should be added to the study of Rhetoric, Poetics, and Dialectic—and how much should be definitively abandoned to the jurisdiction of the “new sciences” themselves.

But insofar as such abandonment is advocated, let us at least bear it in mind that the principles of Rhetoric, Poetics, and Dialectic (and the corresponding dynamics of form, or order) are to be found, mutatis mutandis, within the modes of symbolic action generally. And though questions to do with the arousing and fulfilling of expectations are, in the last analysis, but ways of asking pointed questions about a work’s unity and though they probably cannot be recommended on “purist” grounds, they do serve well as goads, or arrows, prodding us to take a close look at the dynamics or musculature of either Poetical or Rhetorical performances.

Thinking back about Dr. Howell’s reservations, I wonder whether they might boil down to a charge we have heard leveled against others in other quarters and in other connections; namely: “revisionism.” For though I find myself quite in sympathy with the traditions which Dr. Howell would extoll,