GENRE AS SOCIAL ACTION

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ALTHOUGH rhetorical criticism has recently provided a profusion of claims that certain discourses constitute a distinctive class, or genre, rhetorical criticism has not provided firm guidance on what constitutes a genre. For example, rhetorical genres have been defined by similarities in strategies or forms in the discourses,\(^1\) by similarities in audience,\(^2\) by similarities in modes of thinking,\(^3\) by similarities in rhetorical situations.\(^4\) The diversity among these definitions presents both theorists and critics with a problem.

While this problem is created by rhetoricians who have done work in genre theory or criticism, another problem is raised by some who do not believe rhetoricians should do such work at all. John H. Patton and Thomas M. Conley have argued that genre criticism requires too much critical distance between the text and the reader and thus leads to assessments that are not fully responsible. Genre criticism, they contend, invites reductionism, rules, formalism. Patton believes that such analysis results in “critical determinism of the worst sort,”\(^5\) and Conley that it leads to “troublesome and useless taxonomies.”\(^6\)

The urge to classify is fundamental, and although it involves the difficulties that Patton and Conley point out, classification is necessary to language and learning. The variety of critical approaches referred to above indicates the many ways one might classify discourse, but if the term “genre” is to mean anything theoretically or critically useful, it cannot refer to just any category or kind of discourse. One concern in rhetorical theory, then, is to make of rhetorical genre a stable classifying concept; another is to ensure that the concept is rhetorically sound.

In this essay, I will address both of these concerns, the first by developing a perspective on genre that relies on areas of agreement in previous work and connects those areas to corroborating material; the second concern I will address by proposing how an understanding of genre can help account for the way we encounter, interpret, react to, and create particular texts. My effort will elaborate the approach taken by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson and support their position that genre study is valuable not because it might permit the creation of some kind of taxonomy, but because it emphasizes some social and historical aspects of rhetoric that other perspectives do not.\(^7\) I will be arguing that a rhetorically sound definition of genre must be centered not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish. To do so, I will examine the connection between genre and recurrent situation and the way in which genre can be said to represent typified rhetorical action. My analysis will also show how hierarchical models of communication can help illuminate the nature and structure of such rhetorical action.

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Classifying Discourse

A collection of discourses may be sorted into classes in more than one way, as Jackson Harrell and Wil A. Linkugel note in their discussion of genre. Because a classification sorts items on the basis of some set of similarities, the principle used for selecting similarities can tell us much about the classification. A classification of discourse will be rhetorically sound if it contributes to an understanding of how discourse works—that is, if it reflects the rhetorical experience of the people who create and interpret the discourse. As Northrop Frye remarks, "The study of genres has to be founded on the study of convention." A useful principle of classification for discourse, then, should have some basis in the conventions of rhetorical practice, including the ways actual rhetors and audiences have of comprehending the discourse they use.

The semiotic framework provides a way to characterize the principles used to classify discourse, according to whether the defining principle is based in rhetorical substance (semantics), form (syntactics), or the rhetorical action the discourse performs (pragmatics). A classifying principle based in rhetorical action seems most clearly to reflect rhetorical practice (especially since, as I will suggest later, action encompasses both substance and form). And if genre represents action, it must involve situation and motive, because human action, whether symbolic or otherwise, is interpretable only against a context of situation and through the attributing of motives.

"Motive" and "situation" are Kenneth Burke's terms, of course, and Campbell and Jamieson's discussion of genre leans on them implicitly, particularly the latter: "A genre," they write, "does not consist merely of a series of acts in which certain rhetorical forms recur.... Instead, a genre is composed of a constellation of recognizable forms bound together by an internal dynamic" (p. 21). The dynamic "fuses" substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics. The fusion has the character of a rhetorical "response" to situational "demands" perceived by the rhetor. This definition, they maintain, "reflects Burke's view of rhetorical acts as strategies to encompass situations." Their explanation of genre also reflects Lloyd F. Bitzer's formulation of the relationship between situation and discourse, perhaps more than it does Burke's. In Bitzer's definition of rhetorical situation as a "complex of persons, events, objects, and relations" presenting an "exigence" that can be allayed through the mediation of discourse, he establishes the demand-response vocabulary that Campbell and Jamieson adopt. Furthermore, he essentially points the way to genre study, although he does not use the term himself, in observing that situations recur: "From day to day, year to year, comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses." The comparable responses, or recurring forms, become a tradition which then "tends to function as a constraint upon any new response in the form" (p. 13). Thus, inaugurals, eulogies, courtroom speeches, and the like have conventional forms because they arise in situations with similar structures and elements and because rhetors respond in similar ways, having learned from precedent what is appropriate and what effects their actions are likely to have on other people.

Campbell and Jamieson's approach to genre is also fundamentally Aristotelian. In each of the three kinds of rhetoric Aristotle described—deliberative, forensic, and
epideictic—we find a situation-based fusion of form and substance. Each has its characteristic substance: the elements (exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defense, praise and blame) and aims (expedience, justice, honor). Each has its appropriate forms (time or tense, proofs, and style). These fusions of substance and form are grounded in the specific situations calling for extended discourse in ancient Greece, including the audiences that were qualified to participate and the types of judgments they were called upon to make. The three kinds of rhetoric seem to be quite distinct, the various aspects of each to be part of a rational whole. It is likely that an internal “dynamic” of the sort Campbell and Jamieson postulate was at the center of each of these three original genres. (I will comment later on the current status of the Aristotelian genres.)

Two features of this approach are of interest at this point. First, Campbell and Jamieson’s discussion yields a method of classification that meets the requirement of relevance to rhetorical practice. Since “rhetorical forms that establish genres are stylistic and substantive responses to perceived situational demands,” a genre becomes a complex of formal and substantive features that create a particular effect in a given situation (p. 19). Genre, in this way, becomes more than a formal entity; it becomes pragmatic, fully rhetorical, a point of connection between intention and effect, an aspect of social action. This approach is different in an important way from those of Frye and Edwin Black, to which it is indebted. Although both begin by tying genre to situation, Frye with the “radical of presentation” (a kind of schematic rhetorical situation) and Black with the rhetorical “transaction” (emphasizing audience effects), they base their critical analyses on form: strategies, diction, linguistic elements. For them, situation serves primarily to locate a genre; it does not contribute to its character as rhetorical action.

The second feature of interest in Campbell and Jamieson’s method is that they proceed inductively, as critics. They do not attempt to provide a framework that will predict or limit the genres that might be identified. Their interest is less in providing a taxonomic system than in explaining certain aspects of the way social reality evolves: “The critic who classifies a rhetorical artifact as generically akin to a class of similar artifacts has identified an undercurrent of history rather than comprehended an act isolated in time” (p. 26). The result is that the set of genres is an open class, with new members evolving, old ones decaying.12

In contrast to Campbell and Jamieson’s approach is that of Harrell and Linkugel, who proceed deductively, as theorists. Their discussion illustrates one of the risks of theory, that it lends itself to the development of a closed set, usually consisting of few members—a neat taxonomic system that does not reflect rhetorical practice so much as an a priori principle. Harrell and Linkugel begin with a definition that seems similar to that of Campbell and Jamieson: “rhetorical genres stem from organizing principles found in recurring situations that generate discourse characterized by a family of common factors” (pp. 263–4). The “common factors” account for substantive and formal similarities among discourses of the same type, and the “organizing principles,” defined as “assumptions that crystallize the central features of a type of discourse,” seem not unlike the “internal dynamic” of Campbell and Jamieson (p. 264). However, Harrell and Linkugel make of the organizing principle not a dynamic resulting from the interaction of situation and forms but a theoretical premise, unrelated to situation. The organizing principles are based on fundamental
“modes of thinking,” each of which yields a principle of classification: de facto, structural, motivational, and archetypal. The organizing principles, in fact, do not distinguish classes of discourse; they distinguish methods of classifying discourse. The structural principle yields classes based on formal similarities, the motivational yields classes based on pragmatic similarities, and the archetypal yields classes based probably on substantive similarities; the de facto principle apparently yields an unsystematic classification. Harrell and Linkugel suggest, however, that the motivational principle will yield more “productive” generic groups because it better accounts for the interaction between rhetor and situation (in this respect, it seems to be the only principle that adheres to their original definition). To define motivational genres, they adopt Walter R. Fisher’s formulation of four primary “motive states” defined in terms of the possible effects of discourse upon the life of an idea or ideology (affirmation, reaffirmation, purification, and subversion). Fisher’s discussion relies on the Burkean conception that motives are found within or created by situations and that situations are perceived in terms of motives.13

In his own discussion of genre theory, Fisher presents four levels of genre constitution.14 The most general level distinguishes rhetoric from other types of discourse; the second level includes classifications within rhetoric, including (among other possibilities) the four motives; the third contains the rhetorical forms that are commonly identified as genres (eulogies, apologies, nominating speeches, etc.); and the fourth consists of categories described in terms of style. Fisher’s characterization is similar to Harrell and Linkugel’s spectrum, for the four levels of generality require four different principles of classification.

Both of these discussions of genre are useful as ways of accounting for the variety of genre claims that have been made—indeed, they succeed better as classifications of genre criticism than as classifications of discourse. But as theories of genre, they have two shortcomings. First, neither presents a single, clearly defined principle of classification that could promote critical agreement and theoretical clarity. The clearest principles that are presented lead to closed classifications, which sacrifice the diversity and dynamism of rhetorical practice to some theoretical a priori. And second, neither of these discussions grounds genre in situated rhetorical action. The closest approach is Fisher’s four motives, but these operate at a level of abstraction that is too high to represent the practical rhetorical experience of those who use genres. That is, the description of motives in terms of the possible effects of discourse on ideas does not reflect the way human motivation is engaged by particular rhetorical situations. The four motives describe more about human nature than they do about rhetorical practice. And yet, the Burkean relationship between motive and situation that Fisher invokes is promising because it clearly requires an action-based (pragmatic) principle of classification. What is lacking is a connection between the motives and the kind of experience represented by Fisher’s third level and by Harrell and Linkugel’s de facto classification.

Scholars in other fields have been interested in classifying discourse, for both pedagogical and theoretical reasons, and these classifications have occasionally been adopted by rhetoricians as the equivalents of genres. But most of these systems can be dismissed here on the same points: either the classes do not represent rhetorical action or the system is not open. In the fields of literature and composition, classifications are commonly based upon formal rather than pragmatic elements. Rene Wellek and Austin Warren, for example, classify literary genres on both outer form (specific
meter or structure) and inner form (attitude, tone, purpose, as revealed in textual
details). In the field of composition, Cleanth Brooks and Warren (following
Alexander Bain and a long textbook tradition) describe a closed, formal system based
nominally on intention but described according to form: exposition, argumentation,
description, narration. James L. Kinneavy has classified discourse on the basis of
"aim," an apparently pragmatic basis, but he also arrives at a closed system with four
members: expressive, persuasive, literary, and referential discourse. Aim is deter-
mained by which of the four components of a communication model a discourse
"focuses" on: sender, receiver, code, or reality. This scheme suggests a substantive
rather than a pragmatic classification. Linguists have also wrestled with the
problem of classifying discourse, but their efforts have produced systems that are
mostly formal.

In sum, what I am proposing so far is that in rhetoric the term "genre" be limited
to a particular type of discourse classification, a classification based in rhetorical
practice and consequently open rather than closed and organized around situated
actions (that is, pragmatic, rather than syntactic or semantic). I do not mean to
suggest that there is only one way (or one fruitful way) to classify discourse.
Classifications and distinctions based on form and substance have told us much about
sentimentalism, women's liberation, and doctrinal movements, for example. But
we do not gain much by calling all such classes "genres." The classification I am
advocating is, in effect, ethnomethodological: it seeks to explicate the knowledge that
practice creates. This approach insists that the "de facto" genres, the types we have
names for in everyday language, tell us something theoretically important about
discourse. To consider as potential genres such homely discourse as the letter of
recommendation, the user manual, the progress report, the ransom note, the lecture,
and the white paper, as well as the eulogy, the apologia, the inaugural, the public
proceeding, and the sermon, is not to trivialize the study of genres; it is to take
seriously the rhetoric in which we are immersed and the situations in which we find
ourselves.

The problems that remain in defining rhetorical genre become somewhat more
specific than those so far considered. First is the problem of clarifying the
relationship between rhetoric and its context of situation; this is central to
understanding genre as rhetorical action. Second is the problem of understanding the
way in which a genre "fuses" (in Campbell and Jamieson's term) situational with
formal and substantive features. And third is the problem of locating genre on a
hierarchical scale of generalizations about language use, in effect, of choosing among
Fisher's four levels.

Recurrent Rhetorical Situations

Although Burke and Bitzer have both used the term "rhetorical situation,"
Bitzer's work brought a specific version into prominence in rhetorical theory. One
crucial difference between the two is Burke's use of motive and Bitzer's of exigence as
the focus of situation. Although the two concepts are related, there is a tension
between them that requires resolution before the relation of genre to situation can be
clear. Burke's emphasis is on human action, whereas Bitzer's appears to be on
reaction. In particular, Bitzer's use of demand-response language has made it
possible to conceive of exigence as an external cause of discourse and situation as
deterministic, interpretations that have been widely discussed. Because these interpretations create problems for genre theory, a reconceptualization of exegesis is necessary if genre is to be understood as social action.

Bitzer, Alan Brinton, and Patton all emphasize the ontological status of situations as real, objective, historical events. All three describe situation as consisting of two sorts of components: Patton refers to the external and internal components, Brinton to objective and subjective, and Bitzer, in a later essay, to the factual and interest components of exegesis. All three regard the first term as fundamental, as the real part of situation, and the second as a perceptual screen. Patton believes, for instance, that objective phenomena serve as the basis for assessing the “accuracy” of perception. Brinton concludes that the factual component is the exegesis and that consequently there may be “absolute” exigences. Bitzer also describes exegesis as being independent of human awareness: “If drinking water contains a very high level of mercury, then surely an exegesis exists even though no one is aware of the factual condition” (“Functional Communication,” p. 31). For him, exigence can be synonymous with danger. An account of the relationship between rhetoric and situation that thus empowers external, objective elements of situation is a theory that, in Kenneth Burke’s terms, features scene above any other source of motive. Such a theory he characterized as “materialist” in a prophetic passage in The Grammar of Motives: “with materialism,” says Burke, “the circumference of scene is so narrowed as to involve the reduction of action to motion.” Much of the debate regarding situational theory has concerned ways of mitigating the materialist interpretation of it.

What is particularly important about rhetorical situations for a theory of genres is that they recur, as Bitzer originally noted, but in order to understand recurrence, it is necessary to reject the materialist tendencies in situational theory. Campbell and Jamieson observe that in rhetoric “the existence of the recurrent provides insight into the human condition” (p. 27); in the materialist account, the recurrent would lead instead to scientific generalizations. Recurrence is implied by our understanding of situations as somehow “comparable,” “similar,” or “analogous” to other situations, but, as Robert A. Stebbins notes, “objective situations are unique”—they cannot recur. What recurs cannot be a material configuration of objects, events, and people, nor can it be a subjective configuration, a “perception,” for these, too, are unique from moment to moment and person to person. Recurrence is an intersubjective phenomenon, a social occurrence, and cannot be understood on materialist terms.

Situations are social constructs that are the result, not of “perception,” but of “definition.” Because human action is based on and guided by meaning, not by material causes, at the center of action is a process of interpretation. Before we can act, we must interpret the indeterminate material environment; we define, or “determine,” a situation. It is possible to arrive at common determinations of material states of affairs that may have many possible interpretations because, as Alfred Schutz has argued, our “stock of knowledge” is based upon types: “We can . . . imagine a type to be like a line of demarcation which runs between the determinations explicated on the basis of the ‘hitherto existing’ relevance structures . . . and the . . . unlimited possibilities for the determination of experience.” In other words, our stock of knowledge is useful only insofar as it can be brought to bear upon new experience: the new is made familiar through the recognition of rele-
vant similarities; those similarities become constituted as a type. A new type is formed from typifications already on hand when they are not adequate to determine a new situation. If a new typification proves continually useful for mastering states of affairs, it enters the stock of knowledge and its application becomes routine. Although types evolve in this way, most of our stock of knowledge is quite stable. Schutz notes that because types are created and shared through communication, they come to reside in language:

Whatever is typically relevant for the individual was for the most part already typically relevant for his predecessors and has consequently deposited its semantic equivalent in the language. In short, the language can be construed as the sedimentation of typical experiential schemata which are typically relevant in a society (p. 234).

Schutz’s account of types is useful to a theory of rhetorical genres because it shows the importance of classification to human action. It is through the process of typification that we create recurrence, analogies, similarities. What recurs is not a material situation (a real, objective, factual event) but our construal of a type. The typified situation, including typifications of participants, underlies typification in rhetoric. Successful communication would require that the participants share common types; this is possible insofar as types are socially created (or biologically innate).

The linguist M. A. K. Halliday provides a corroborating perspective on situation types: “the apparently infinite number of different possible situations represents in reality a very much smaller number of general types of situations, which we can describe in such terms as ‘players instructing novice in a game,’ ‘mother reading bedtime story to child,’ ‘customer ordering goods over the telephone,’ ‘teacher guiding pupils,’ ‘discussion of a poem,’ and the like.” Typification is possible, here again, because situation “is not an inventory of ongoing sights and sounds but a semiotic structure” (p. 122). Moreover, the situation type is the developmental basis for meaning. In his work on the development of language in the child, Halliday finds that the child first learns a restricted set of functions that language can accomplish: “The child’s uses of language are interpretable as generalized situation types; the meanings that he can express are referable to specific social contexts.” These original, limited uses of language expand as the child encounters and conceives a wide variety of social contexts, and “the adult has indefinitely many uses of language” (“Learning to Mean,” p. 253). Systematizing or classifying the uses of adult language would, therefore, be difficult, according to Halliday: “the nearest we can come to that is some concept of situation type” (“Language as Social Semiotic, p. 46).

If rhetorical situation is not material and objective, but a social construct, or semiotic structure, how are we to understand exigence, which is at the core of situation? Exigence must be located in the social world, neither in a private perception nor in material circumstance. It cannot be broken into two components without destroying it as a rhetorical and social phenomenon. Exigence is a form of social knowledge—a mutual construing of objects, events, interests, and purposes that not only links them but also makes them what they are: an objectified social need. This is quite different from Bitzer’s characterization of exigence as a “defect” or danger. Conversely, although exigence provides the rhetor with a sense of rhetorical purpose, it is clearly not the same as the rhetor’s intention, for that can be
ill-formed, dissembling, or at odds with what the situation conventionally supports. The exigence provides the rhetor with a socially recognizable way to make his or her intentions known. It provides an occasion, and thus a form, for making public our private versions of things.

Bitzer argues that when Gerald Ford pardoned former President Nixon, Ford saw the exigence as "protection of the national interest, which would be harmed if Watergate were not put behind us as quickly as possible," while other citizens saw the exigence as seeing justice done ("Functional Communication," p. 30). The exigence, however, was what served as the grounds for Ford's doing anything at all—the need to establish a relationship with the previous administration, an exigence with unusual constraints in this case and one that could engage any of several particular intentions.

Exigence must be seen neither as a cause of rhetorical action nor as intention, but as social motive. To comprehend an exigence is to have a motive. Except in a primitive sense, our motives are not private or idiosyncratic; they are products of our socialization, as Burke makes clear: "Motives are distinctly linguistic products. We discern situational patterns by means of the particular vocabulary of the cultural group into which we are born." Schutz says much the same thing: "Typed patterns of the Others' behavior become in turn motives of my own actions." Exigence is a set of particular social patterns and expectations that provides a socially objectified motive for addressing danger, ignorance, separateness. It is an understanding of social need in which I know how to take an interest, in which one can intend to participate. By "defining" a material circumstance as a particular situation type, I find a way to engage my intentions in it in a socially recognizable and interpretable way. As Burke put it, "situations are shorthand terms for motives" (Permanence and Change, p. 29).

Herbert Blumer observed that "the preponderant portion of social action in a human society, particularly in a settled society, exists in the form of recurrent patterns of joint action." Here is a rationale for the study of rhetorical genres. To base a classification of discourse upon recurrent situation or, more specifically, upon exigence understood as social motive, is to base it upon the typical joint rhetorical actions available at a given point in history and culture. Studying the typical uses of rhetoric, and the forms that it takes in those uses, tells us less about the art of individual rhetors or the excellence of particular texts than it does about the character of a culture or an historical period. For example, David Kaufer makes a telling point about classical Greek rhetoric when he observes that the "number of definable types of rhetorical situations in Classical culture appears both curiously small and stable." The three Aristotelian genres signal a particular and limited role for rhetoric, according to Kaufer, but a very important one: maintaining "the normal functions of the state."

By contrast, Burke observes that in an age of "marked instability" such as ours, typical patterns are not widely shared and hence the matter of motivation is "liquid" (Permanence and Change, pp. 32–33). We may not know our own motives, we cannot name them, what recurs for me does not for someone else; with a wealth of stimuli and a dearth of shared knowledge, we hardly know how to engage each other in discourse. We have many and confused intentions, but few effective orientation centers for joint action. This may be why the whole matter of genre has become problematic.
Hierarchical Theories of Meaning

If we understand genres as typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations, we must conclude that members of a genre are discourses that are complete, in the sense that they are circumscribed by a relatively complete shift in rhetorical situation. Thus, we should recognize a lecture or a eulogy or a technical manual or a public proceeding by our determination of the typified rhetorical situation. But this does not go very far toward indicating how the genre works as rhetorical action, how we come to understand the generic meaning of “eulogy” as fitting to the social exigence that a death produces. The “generic fusion” that Campbell and Jamieson predicate of substantive, stylistic, and situational elements is, in their view, the key to understanding the meaningfulness or “significance” of a genre. Again using semiotic terminology, it is possible to explicate this “fusion” and to specify how it is central to a theory of meaning.

A particular kind of fusion of substance and form is essential to symbolic meaning. Substance, considered as the semantic value of discourse, constitutes the aspects of common experience that are being symbolized. Burke maintains that substance is drawn from our “acting-together,” which gives us “common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes.” Form is perceived as the ways in which substance is symbolized. Campbell and Jamieson adopt Burke’s understanding of form as “an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence.” Form shapes the response of the reader or listener to substance by providing instruction, so to speak, about how to perceive and interpret; this guidance disposes the audience to anticipate, to be gratified, to respond in a certain way. Seen thus, form becomes a kind of meta-information, with both semantic value (as information) and syntactic (or formal) value. Form and substance thus bear a hierarchical relationship to each other.

This hierarchical relationship is implicit in speech-act theory, where meaning, according to John Searle, has two elements: an utterance or proposition and the action it is used to perform, indicated as illocutionary force. But such meaning-as-action exists only within a larger interpretive context. Stephen Toulmin explains how Wittgenstein described context:

Any expression owes its linguistic meaning (Wittgenstein taught) to having been given a standard rule-governed use or uses, in the context of such activities [language-games]. Language-games in turn, however, must be understood in their own broader contexts; and for those contexts Wittgenstein introduced the phrase “forms of life.”

This description suggests that context is a third hierarchical level to meaning, encompassing both substance and form and enabling interpretation of the action resulting from their fusion.

But since context itself is hierarchical, as Toulmin emphasizes, we can think of form, substance, and context as relative, not absolute; they occur at many levels on a hierarchy of meaning. When form and substance are fused at one level, they acquire semantic value which is then subject to formalizing at a higher level. At one level, for example, the semantic values of a string of words and their syntactic relationships in a sentence acquire meaning (pragmatic value as action) when together they serve as substance for the higher-level form of the speech act. In turn, this combination of
Hierarchical relationships of substance, form, and meaning-as-action. The combination of form and substance at one level becomes an action (has meaning) at a higher level when that combination itself acquires form. Each action is interpretable against the context provided by actions at higher levels.

substance and form acquires meaning when it serves as substance for the still higher-level form imposed by, say, a language-game. Thus, form at one level becomes an aspect of substance at a higher level (this is what makes form "significant"), although it is still analyzable as form at the lower level. Figure 1 diagrams this kind of progression. It is through this hierarchical combination of form and substance that symbolic structures take on pragmatic force and become interpretable actions; when fused, the substantive and formal components can acquire meaning in context. A complex hierarchy of such relationships is necessary for constructing meaning.

Two recent communication models instantiate this hierarchical principle in remarkably similar ways; together, they suggest a connection between rhetorical genre and the hierarchical fusion of form and substance. One model, developed by Thomas S. Frentz and Thomas B. Farrell, is grounded specifically in action theory and makes explicit use of the rules approach to communication. The "paradigm" they propose consists of three "hierarchically structured constructs": context, episodes, and symbolic acts. Context "specifies the criteria for interpreting both the meaningfulness and propriety of any communicative event.\textsuperscript{40} It consists of two hierarchical levels—form of life and encounters. "Form of life," Wittgenstein's term, is used by Frentz and Farrell to refer to the cultural patterns, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, that give significance to actions, both linguistic and nonlinguistic. Encounters, the second level of context, "particularize form of life through rules of propriety" (p. 335); they are "points of contact" in concrete locations, providing the specific situational dimension to context. The second level of the hierarchy is the episode, a "rule-conforming sequence of symbolic acts generated by two or more actors who are collectively oriented toward emergent goals" (p. 336). And the third and lowest level of the model is the symbolic act, the "component" of the episode. Symbolic acts are "verbal and/or nonverbal utterances which express intentionality" (p. 340), characterized in much the way Searle describes speech acts.
Another hierarchical model of communication, proposed by W. Barnett Pearce and Forrest Conklin, addresses the problem of interpreting nonliteral meanings in conversation. Pearce’s earlier work found that conversational coherence requires “coordinated management of meaning” among participants and that such coordination is accomplished through rules. In the later model, each level of meaning provides a context for constituents at lower levels by means of rule-governed relationships. The model consists of five levels in all: archetypes, episodes, speech acts, propositions (grammatical utterances), and the stream of behavior that must be interpreted. Archetypes are “those fundamental logical operations or symbolic reasoning procedures which persons use to detect or generate patterns in the sequence of events.” These are based on the common physiology that human beings share and in the common physical properties of the world they live in (p. 78). Episodes are “sequences of messages which have a starting and a stopping point and an internal structure”; these patterned sequences provide the context for speech acts. The hierarchical levels are connected by sets of rules that coordinate cognitive movement between them. Between the top two levels are rules of symbolic identification; between the second two are rules of sociation; between the third and fourth are rules of communication; and between the last two, rules of information processing.

These two hierarchical schemes are persuasive, in part because of their comprehensiveness, in part because of their similarities, and in part because of their consistency with other social and psychological theory. Although neither one has anything explicit to say about rhetorical genre, they provide a background for understanding genre as meaningful action that is rule governed (which is to say interpretable by means of conventions).

Sharon D. Downey, moreover, has provided a rule-based explication of genre that is consistent with these two schemes; she defines genre as “a classification of rhetorical discourses whose recurrent constitutive and regulative rules are similar in distinction and pattern.” In the terms I have been using, her explanation maintains that it is constitutive rules that tell us how to fuse form and substance to make meaning and regulative rules that tell us how the fusion itself is to be interpreted within its context. For example, conventions of form and substance combine according to constitutive rules to create the typified rhetorical action of the eulogy; in addition, the action is interpretable under regulative rules provided by larger contexts, like religion or public affairs. Seen this way, the rhetorical genre is clearly analogous to the levels of meaning of the two communication models.

Figure 2 proposes a hierarchy similar to these models but including genre. Genre appears at a level of complete discourse types based on recurrent situations; genres are provided interpretive context by form-of-life patterns and are constituted by intermediate forms or strategies, analogous to the dialogic episode. Because communication must rest on experience, the lowest level must be that in which symbolizing takes place. Beyond symbols, experience is idiosyncratic and incommunicable. At the other extreme, we can envision universal experience, or the biological-psychological nature of the human species, Burke’s “universal” rhetorical situation (Rhetoric, p. 146). Burke, in fact, offers a range of motives that spans both extremes of the hierarchy:

Each man’s motivation is unique, since his situation is unique, which is particularly
obvious when you recall that his situation also reflects the unique sequence of his past. However, for all this uniqueness of the individual, there are motives and relationships generic to all mankind—and these are intrinsic to human agents as a class (Grammar, pp. 103–4).

At the level of the locution or speech act, idiosyncratic motives (or what I earlier called intentions) predominate. At the level of human nature (or archetypes) motives of the sort that Fisher describes have their force. But at the level of the genre, motive becomes a conventionalized social purpose, or exigence, within the recurrent situation. In constructing discourse, we deal with purposes at several levels, not just one. We learn to adopt social motives as ways of satisfying private intentions through rhetorical action. This is how recurring situations seem to "invite" discourse of a particular type.

The exact number of hierarchical levels of meaning may not be determinable with any precision, and it may be that different kinds of communication emphasize different levels. Because monologue and dialogue pose different problems, for example, they probably operate with differing hierarchical structures. In dialogue, because the audience tends to be small and constraints managed through interactive coordination, personal intentions manifest themselves more easily. Such interaction requires elaboration of the rule structure at the lower levels of the hierarchy, to guide turn-taking, implicature, and management of multiple intentions. In monologue, personal intentions must be accommodated to public exigences—because the audience is larger, the opportunity for complex statement is greater, and constraints are less easily managed; more elaborate rule structures at the upper end of the hierarchy, at the level of whole discourses, are therefore necessary for both formulation and interpretation.

As Herbert W. Simons observed, one of the important problems raised by recent genre theory is that "genres 'exist' at various levels of abstraction, from the very broad to the very specific" (p. 36). Indeed, the classifications of Fisher and of Harrell and Linkugel illustrated this problem. But if we define genre by its association with recurrent rhetorical situations, the exact hierarchical level at which the abstraction called genre occurs will be determined by our sense of recurrence of rhetorical situations; this will vary from culture to culture, according to the typifications available. Thus, the term "genre" might under differing circumstances be applied to

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FIGURE 2.
Proposed hierarchy of meaning, incorporating genre, compared with those of Frentz and Farrell and of Pearce and Conklin. Note the relationship of the four lowest levels in the proposed hierarchy to Figure 1; the higher levels would extend that figure beyond three levels of action.
the class of all public addresses in a society, to the class of all inaugural speeches, or to the class of all American presidential inaugurals.

It is worth noting, in addition, that there are two kinds of hierarchies to which genre may be seen to belong, and it is helpful to keep them distinct. One kind arranges single discourses into classes and the classes into broader classes; this is the kind to which Simon refers. The other arranges constituents into units and units into larger wholes (words, sentences, speech acts, texts, etc.), in the manner of the hierarchies in Figure 2.45 Genre is hierarchical in both senses, but the second has more to do with its rhetorical significance, that is, the way it works as a source of meaning.

Implications

The understanding of rhetorical genre that I am advocating is based in rhetorical practice, in the conventions of discourse that a society establishes as ways of “acting together.” It does not lend itself to taxonomy, for genres change, evolve, and decay; the number of genres current in any society is indeterminate and depends upon the complexity and diversity of the society. The particular features of this understanding of genre are these:

1. Genre refers to a conventional category of discourse based in large-scale typification of rhetorical action; as action, it acquires meaning from situation and from the social context in which that situation arose.
2. As meaningful action, genre is interpretable by means of rules; genre rules occur at a relatively high level on a hierarchy of rules for symbolic interaction.
3. Genre is distinct from form: form is the more general term used at all levels of the hierarchy. Genre is a form at one particular level that is a fusion of lower-level forms and characteristic substance.
4. Genre serves as the substance of forms at higher levels; as recurrent patterns of language use, genres help constitute the substance of our cultural life.
5. A genre is a rhetorical means for mediating private intentions and social exigence; it motivates by connecting the private with the public, the singular with the recurrent.

Although this perspective on genre is not precise enough to permit quantification of formal features or elucidation of a complete hierarchy of rules, it can provide guidance in the evaluation of genre claims. Specifically, it suggests that a collection of discourses (or a potential collection) may fail to constitute a genre in three major ways. First, there may fail to be significant substantive or formal similarities at the lower levels of the hierarchy. Genre claims are rarely made without this kind of first-line evidence, however. Second, there may be inadequate consideration of all the elements in recurrent rhetorical situations. A genre claim may be based on similarities only in exigence or only in audience, etc. This type of claim is sometimes made about particularly novel or subtle combinations of forms by which a rhetor addresses a situation. In such a case, however, the rhetorical situation will be differently construed by rhetor and audience. The discourse constitutes an adaptation of form and substance to a private purpose, not a public exigence; the particular fusion achieved is based not on all the recurrent aspects of situation but on the unique ones. Ronald H. Carpenter’s study of the historical jeremiad makes such a claim,
based on evidence that three works "share salient formal characteristics." But these works, rather, adapt the genre of historical essay to personal goals: they do not constitute another genre, because the motive that makes the discourse a social action is shared only for the historical essay, not for the jeremiad.

Another more general failure of this second sort is the attempt to use the Aristotelian types to identify contemporary genres. Although developed from recurrent situations in ancient Greece, these original genres do not describe complete situation-types that recur today—they are too general. Michael Halloran has suggested, for instance, that the public proceeding is a specialized and elaborated descendant of the epidictic genre; his analysis shows the public proceeding to be based in a recurrent situation (with several variants) and to involve elements of all three Aristotelian genres. For us, epidictic serves not as a single genre but as a form of life—a celebratory (or reaffirmative) arena of social life in which situation-types develop. The original genres also persist as constituent strategies of contemporary genres. Jamieson and Campbell's recent discussion of the rhetorical hybrid develops this point by noting the ways critics have found the three original genres permeating each other in practice and by offering an extended critique of several hybrids in recent American political rhetoric. The hybrid—a transient combination of forms based in a nonrecurrent (or not yet recurrent) situation—is itself not a genre but the adaptation of a genre to "the idiosyncratic needs of a particular situation, institution, and rhetor" (p. 157). In their analysis of the deliberative eulogy, it is clear that hybridization occurs not between genres but between subforms, on the level of what I have called strategies: in their examples of the eulogies of Robert Kennedy, "eulogistic [generic] requirements predominate and deliberative appeals [strategies] are subordinate" (p. 150).

The third way a genre claim may fail is if there is no pragmatic component, no way to understand the genre as a social action. In a study of Environmental Impact Statements during their first five years, I concluded that this clearly defined class of documents did not constitute a rhetorical genre because it did not achieve a rational fusion of elements—in spite of obvious similarities in form and substance, and in spite of a recurring rhetorical situation that was, in fact, defined by law. These documents had no coherent pragmatic force for two reasons: first, the cultural forms in which they were embedded provided conflicting interpretive contexts; and second, there was no satisfactory fusion of substance and form that could serve as substance to higher-level forms and contexts. For example, the probabilistic judgments that are the substance of environmental science conflicted with the formal requirements of objectivity and quantification; further, the patterns of thinking in the context of administrative bureaucracies created a set of values at variance with the environmental values invoked by the legislation requiring impact statements. Overall, the imperfect fusion of scientific, legal, and administrative elements prevented interpretation of the documents as meaningful rhetorical action. This conclusion was, of course, substantiated by the legal and administrative problems the early impact statements created and their frequent criticism in industry, government, and the environmental movement.

What are the implications of the absence of a genre on the meaning-hierarchy? To say that a genre does not exist is not to imply that there are no interpretive rules at that level on the hierarchy. It means that the rules do not form a normative whole that we can consider a cultural artifact, that is, a representation of reasoning and
purposes characteristic of the culture. The class of discourses is just a class of discourses; the set of rules is just a set of rules. But further, the absence of a normative whole at that level poses problems of certain kinds. It means that the interpreter must have a strong understanding of forms at both higher and lower levels, in order to bridge the gap at the level of genre. Similarly, in reading written discourse, we must base inferences about probable speech acts on strongly delineated propositions, at the level below, and strategies or episodes, at the level above.

The perspective on genres proposed here has implications not only for criticism and theory, but also for rhetorical education. It suggests that what we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern of forms or even a method of achieving our own ends. We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have: we learn that we may eulogize, apologize, recommend one person to another, instruct customers on behalf of a manufacturer, take on an official role, account for progress in achieving goals. We learn to understand better the situations in which we find ourselves and the potentials for failure and success in acting together. As a recurrent, significant action, a genre embodies an aspect of cultural rationality. For the critic, genres can serve both as an index to cultural patterns and as tools for exploring the achievements of particular speakers and writers; for the student, genres serve as keys to understanding how to participate in the actions of a community.

NOTES


7Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Form and Genre in Rhetorical Criticism: An Introduction,” in Campbell and Jamieson, pp. 9–32. Further references to this essay will be made in the text.

8Jackson Harrell and Wil A. Linkugel, “On Rhetorical Genre: An Organizing Perspective,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 11 (1978), 262–81; their essay, like this one, is motivated by the belief that rhetorical criticism suffers from the lack of a good theory of genres. Further references to this essay will be made in the text.


12It should be noted that this type of induction is different from that advocated by Herbert Simons (“‘Generalizing’ About Rhetoric: A Scientific Approach,” in Campbell and Jamieson, pp. 33–50). Although Simons defines a genre as “a distinctive and recurring pattern of similarly constrained rhetorical practices,” a definition similar to that of Campbell and Jamieson, the method he advocates leads to quite different results. He recommends a factor-analytic examination of large numbers of texts to identify the distinctive and recurring patterns. Campbell and Jamieson, on the other hand, emphasize close examination of a single text or a small number of texts to identify the fusion of forms responsive to situation. For Simons, then, the genre just is the collection of texts; for Campbell and Jamieson, the
genre is the form of forms exemplified by a text or texts; the genre represents "not only... what has recurred but... what may recur" (p. 24).


6"The language process seems to be capable of focusing attention on one of its own components as primary in a given situation" (p. 59). The fundamental problem in Kinneavy's system is the confusion of "aim" with "use"; "The different uses of language are... a matter of which element of the [language] process dominates" (p. 38). See Walter H. Beale, "On the Classification of Discourse Performances," Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 7 (1977), 31-40, for a more complete critique of Kinneavy's work.


8See Edwin Black, "The Sentimental Style as Escapism, or The Devil with Daniel Webster," in Campbell and Jamieson, pp. 75-86, and the essays by Campbell and Hart, cited earlier.


13In an earlier statement, Bitzer seemed aware of the problem into which this example of the drinking water leads him. In the 1980 "Forum," he wrote, "exigences are not 'objective' in the sense of being simply factual; nor are exigences wholly independent of human apprehension" (p. 90). Robert Scott: points out that "Bitzer's insistence throughout on reality and not sociality is no accident in the fashion of terms" ("Intentionality in the Rhetorical Process," in White, p. 57). He suggests a revaluation of the situational theory to recognize the intentionality of beings who act within a social reality.

14Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 131. Materialism is not an exhaustive characterization of Bitzer's discussion of situation. In "Functional Communication," especially, there are strong elements of pragmatism, which Burke characterizes as the featuring of agency, and to the extent that Bitzer features the capacity of the rhetorical act to effect change, his work illustrates what Burke calls realism. In contrast, Vatz's emphasis on the creative power of the rhor corresponds to the featuring of agent, which Burke characterizes as idealism.


16As Bruce Gronbeck has observed, in a theory of communication based on social facts, "the idea of 'cause' almost disappears." Qualitative Communication Theory and Rhetorical Studies in the 1980s," Central States Speech Journal, 32 (1981), 253.


20Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 35. Fisher's discussion of motivs builds upon this same theme in Burke's work.

42 Van Dijk, for example, says that the tasks involved in language, perception, complex planning, and action "cannot possibly be accounted for at the level of linear processing of micro-information, but . . . hierarchical rules and categories and the formation of macro-structures are necessary" (Text and Context, cited above, note 16, p. 159).
43 A likely reason for this failure to connect is that the hierarchical models and the study of genres come from different research traditions. Genre has been useful in discussions of literary art, written rhetoric, and public address, all of which are forms of monologue. The hierarchical models draw from work in interpersonal communication, which relies on dialogue. It seems reasonable to suppose that monologue and dialogue do not "mean" in different ways and that a hierarchy of rules and interpretive contexts might be as applicable to monologue as to dialogue. The constituents of each model do not preclude such an assumption, being for the most part terms common to rhetorical analysis.
44 Sharon D. Downey, "The Evolution of Rhetorical Genres," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association, Louisville, Kentucky, 1982. An important difference between her discussion and mine is that Downey does not distinguish between form and action.
45 In this type of hierarchy, one can deal either with instances or with types. John Searle has proposed a classification of speech-act types, but these types could not be further clustered into text types—that would mix the two kinds of hierarchies ("A Taxonomy of Iloctionary Acts," in Language, Mind and Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. VII [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975], pp. 344–69).